Old habits die hard

A hopeful story from Pakistan (may its tribe increase), spoiled by the usual old American habits of short-term thinking.

The New York Times tells us about the new breed of politicians rising in Pakistan.

In Pakistan, where politics has long been a matter of pedigree, Jamshed Dasti is a mongrel. The scrappy son of an amateur wrestler, Mr. Dasti has clawed his way into Pakistan’s Parliament, beating the wealthy, landed families who have ruled here.

This is a big change. As the article explains,

For years, feudal lords reigned supreme, serving as the police, the judge and the political leader. Plantations had jails, and political seats were practically owned by families.

Instead of midwifing democracy, these aristocrats obstructed it, ignoring the needs of rural Pakistanis, half of whom are still landless and desperately poor more than 60 years after Pakistan became a state.

But now, it seems, the stranglehold of the feudal classes slowly loosens. Newer, more populist candidates get elected, who actually meet with their constituents and try to address their concerns. Of course, many of them are rough men with criminal records, but:

Whatever the case, he is deeply appealing to Pakistanis, who have chosen him over feudal lords for political seats several times. Local residents call him Rescue One-Five, a reference to an emergency hot line number and his feverish work habits. Constituents clutching dirty plastic bags of documents flock to his small office for help, and he scribbles out notes for them on his Parliament letterhead like a doctor in a field hospital.

Contrast this example with a feudal lord:

Mr. Mehmoud, 48, is a wealthy man of leisure, who spends more time relaxing in his house — a pink replica of a Rajasthani palace with a hand-carved facade — than on his job as a lawmaker. Sometimes he talks to his constituents, but more often he watches them go by from the window of his speedy, white Hummer.

For years, people voted for him anyway, partly out of habit. His ancestors were considered to be distant relatives of the Prophet Muhammad, which inspires awe and respect. But more important, his constituents were tied to him economically. His family owned the land they worked and often their houses. His carpet has a worn patch where generations of peasants sat in supplication.

No wonder the feudals are losing their seats, as labor becomes more mobile and more people wake up to their rights.

So, does the American analyst see this as a hopeful sign? Of course not:

The result is a changing political landscape more representative of Pakistani society, but far less predictable for the United States. Mr. Dasti, 32, speaks no English. His legislative record includes opposition to a sexual harassment bill. He has 35 criminal cases to his name and is from the country’s conservative heartland, where dislike of America runs deep.

So, it doesn't matter if he's popularly elected: he doesn't speak English, is a Neanderthal like Newt Gingrich, and comes from a backward and xenophobic area, so we have a problem with it? We still haven't changed our old habits in how we look at Pakistan.

And finally, this is the paragraph that made Boston Brahmin sputter out his morning coffee:

The changes also leave room for Islamists. In the neighboring district of Dera Ghazi Khan, a hard-line mullah, Hafiz Abdul Karim, came within a few thousand votes in 2008 of unseating Farooq Leghari, a former president of Pakistan. His weapon? Efficient, Islamist campaign workers and free water pumps.

So far, Islamists have not tapped popular frustration in a systematic way at the ballot box, and the military, the country’s oldest, strongest institution, would probably put down any broader uprising, analysts say.

Ah -- not to worry. Our favorite nephew, the Pakistan army, will take care of the uppity natives if needed.

This analysis is wrong on so many levels. Let me just list three: first, even if the hard-line mullah's workers are Islamists, if he is running for elections with free water pumps, this can only be a good thing, no? Second: do we still really want the Pakistan army to intervene in politics? If running for elections and winning by giving the people water pumps is the "broader uprising", then we need more of those in Pakistan. What legitimacy does the army have in intervening? And third: have we not learned yet that the army is an ally of the Islamists, in fact the sponsor and protector of some of them? In every army action, the army picks and chooses its favorite Islamists.

One would think that the U.S. troops being killed in Afghanistan by Pakistan army-sponsored Islamists might give these analysts pause. But no. Before Pakistan, the real change, it seems, is needed in our own analysts, whose old habits die hard.

The Sun in the Sky

A recent paper by Matt Waldman of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government documents systematic and ongoing support by the Pakistan military of the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Some excerpts, based on interviews with several Taliban and Haqqani commanders:

Support to the Afghan insurgency is official ISI policy. It appears to be carried out by both serving and former officers, who have considerable operational autonomy.

A number of analysts suggest that due to American and international pressure in 2006, 2007 or later, Pakistan has curtailed its support for the insurgents, but there is little evidence to support this.

Waldman summarizes that:

Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of astonishing magnitude. The conflict has led to the deaths of over 1,000 American and 700 other foreign military personnel; thousands of Afghan soldiers, police, officials and civilians; and an unknown number of Afghan, Pakistani and other foreign insurgents. It has already cost America nearly $300 billion, and now costs over $70 billion a year. As a Haqqani commander put it: ‘Of course Pakistan is the main cause of the problems [in Afghanistan] but America is behind Pakistan.’

Why is Pakistan doing this? Their overriding concern is India.

As Steve Coll explains (The New Yorker, 1 March 2010): ‘Pakistan’s generals have retained a bedrock belief that, however unruly and distasteful Islamist militias such as the Taliban may be, they could yet be useful proxies to ward off a perceived existential threat from India. In the Army’s view, at least, that threat has not receded.’

So, what does Waldman conclude that the U.S. should do?

The priority must be to address the fundamental causes of Pakistan’s insecurity, in particular its latent and enduring conflict with India. This requires a regional peace process and, as Bruce Riedel has argued, American backing for moves towards a resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

So, in other words, if the Kashmir dispute is resolved, the Pakistan army will no longer see India as a threat, and they will then stop sponsoring terrorism? This conclusion sounds weak, because it is based on the assumption that the Pakistan army's hatred of India is a rational response to something India has done or not done.

But this hatred is not based on what India does or does not do. It is a self-sustaining mechanism of survival for the Pakistan military, whose enormous clout and influence within Pakistan depends on always having an external threat. Their hatred of India is institutionalized since the founding of Pakistan, and especially since Zia's Islamization.

And that is as clear as the Sun in the Sky.

Hearts and minds in Afghanistan

The latest ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD poll from December 2009, Afghanistan--–where things stand, naturally concentrates on the increasing confidence (since last year) that Afghans have in U.S. and ISAF forces and in the Afghan National Army.

But buried within the report is a question whose answer has been almost unchanged since last year:

Overall, please say if you think each of these countries
is playing a positive, neutral, or negative role
in Afghanistan now?

              12/23/09 – Summary table

              Positive  Neutral  Negative  No opinion
a. Russia          22    38       31        9
b. Iran            27    29       39        5
c. Pakistan         9    13       73        5
d. India           36    44       13        6
e. U.S.            45    18       31        6
f. U.K.            28    31       31       10
g. Germany         32    39       19        9

There is also an "overall impression" question, whose results are similar:

Now I’m going to ask what you think about some people and groups.
Is your opinion of [INSERT] very favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

              12/23/09 – Summary table

                 ----- Favorable -----   ---- Unfavorable ----   No
                 NET   Very   Somewhat   NET   Somewhat   Very  opinion
a. The Taliban    10    3         7       89     13        75     1
b. Osama Bin Laden 6    2         4       91     13        77     3
c. The U.S.       51    8        43       46     21        25     3
d. Pakistan       16    2        13       81     32        49     3
e. Great Britain  39    7        32       53     28        24     9
f. Iran           50   18        32       45     25        20     6
g. Germany        58   17        42       34     21        14     8
h. India          71   29        42       22     14         7     7
i. Hamid Karzai   82   55        28       13      8         5     5
j. Al Qaeda and other
   foreign jihadis 8    3         5       86     19        67     6

The most popular entity here, after Hamid Karzai's 82 percent favorable rating, is India. And the most disliked, after the Taliban and Al Qaeda, is Pakistan.

Problem avoidance

Ex-CIA officer Graham Fuller wrote in the Huffington Post about why the United States should de-escalate in Afghanistan:

India is the primary geopolitical threat to Pakistan, not Afghanistan. Pakistan must therefore always maintain Afghanistan as a friendly state. India furthermore is intent upon gaining a serious foothold in Afghanistan -- in the intelligence, economic and political arenas -- that chills Islamabad.

(Link to his May 10, 2009 article).
This line may be straight out of General Kayani's diary. It accurately describes the perception in the leadership in Pakistan.

Unfortunately, Fuller presents this "geopolitical threat" from India as an objective truth. As Shashi Tharoor said last month in an interview, Pakistan has nothing that India seeks.

Fuller's article is also dishonest because it leaves out an obvious part of the equation: Pakistan's continuing support of Islamist militas as leverage against its neighbors. If, as Fuller suggests, America draws down its military footprint in Afghanistan, then the Taliban will come back with Pakistan's support, either overt or tacit. Afghanistan will return to the pre-9/11 clutches of the Taliban--- a hell-hole for ordinary Afghans, and where the 9/11 attacks were hatched.

The problem with the knee-jerk anti-war movement is that is avoids the truth and seeks to bring us back into our shells. That's no way to engage with the world.

A bankruptcy of logic

Of all the people complaining about President Obama's Afghan war escalation, Tom Friedman takes the cake:

Iraq was about "the war on terrorism." The Afghanistan invasion, for me, was about the "war on terrorists." To me, it was about getting bin Laden and depriving Al Qaeda of a sanctuary—- period. I never thought we could make Afghanistan into Norway-— and even if we did, it would not resonate beyond its borders the way Iraq might.

To now make Afghanistan part of the "war on terrorism"—- i.e., another nation-building project-— is not crazy. It is just too expensive...

(Here is his Op-Ed in the New York Times).

So, let me get this straight: the war in Iraq, launched on false premises and so badly executed, was a necessary nation-building project? And the war in Afghanistan, being escalated by Obama precisely to help "get Bin Laden and depriving Al Qaeda of a sanctuary" is too expensive? This doesn't make any sense.

I think I prefer the knee-jerk anti-war crowd to this kind of sophistry. At least the anti-war people are consistent.

Now it's on HBO-- Terror in Mumbai

Now that it is showing on HBO, with Fareed Zakaria presenting, maybe Dan Reed's documentary "Terror in Mumbai" will actually be seen. When it was first aired on Britain's Channel 4 this summer, no one in the United States seemed to know or care.

For those who still don't know what "Terror in Mumbai" is: it is a brilliant, gripping documentary about the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. In the words of director Dan Reed:

Of all the material which I acquired in the course of making my documentary, Terror in Mumbai, it is the phone intercepts - recordings by Indian intelligence of mobile phone traffic between the young gunmen and their handlers back in Pakistan - which I found the most chilling.

The close-up rustling, the tense silences, the gunshots, the amazement at the luxury of the five-star hotels which continued to amaze me every time I played back the recording during the edit. And above all the horrifying, dead-pan practicality of the preparations for taking the lives of innocents.

(Link to his notes at Channel 4 web site).

HBO adds a presentation by Fareed Zakaria, who says,

Much as the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. did in 2001, the events that unfolded last November in Mumbai served as a terrifying wake-up call, not just to India but to the rest of the world. It broadened the spectrum of our enemies and brought attention to the number of different terrorist groups that exist, who may be bigger and better organized than we ever imagined. The fact that a small group of gunmen was able to inflict so much pain, and the government of the second most populous nation on earth was unable to stop them for three days, should change our sense of the dangers out there.

Here are the schedules for the HBO showings. Happy Thanksgiving.

The Headley Affair

Indian newspapers have been abuzz for weeks about the arrest in Chicago of two men of Pakistani origin: David Coleman Headley (aka Daood Gilani), and Tahawwur Hussain Rana. These two stand accused by the FBI of a conspiracy to do violence against the editors of Jyllands-Posten, the newspaper in Denmark that published cartoons of Prophet Muhammad.

It seems that both Headley and Rana had traveled multiple times to India, possibly to scout locations for terrorist attacks. So, India's new NIA wants to investigate them for links with Lashkar-e-Taiba.

But the most explosive significance of their arrest is not mentioned in the unsealed complaint---not only is Headley accused of collaborating with Lashkar-e-Taiba, but that he worked closely with two ex-military officers in Pakistan; he regularly visited Pakistan, where he was born and attended school. A New York Times article yesterday said,

The case is one of the first criminal cases in which the federal authorities seem to have directly linked terrorism suspects in the United States to a former Pakistani military officer, though they have long suspected connections between extremists and many members of the Pakistani military. Intelligence officials believe that some Pakistani military and intelligence officials even encourage terrorists to attack what they see as Pakistan’s enemies, including targets in India.

(Link to NYT article).

This thing is what the Pakistan Inter-Services Public Relations (IPSR) typically calls "a sensitive matter", not to be discussed in polite company. The FBI, unlike the CIA or the U.S. military, is likely to follow the threads to their logical conclusions. The next few days should produce significant findings, especially if Headley is cooperating.